This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modi¯ed when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, either discriminating or nondiscriminating, congestion is fully internalized, provided that a separability assumption on travel bene¯ts is satis¯ed. The analysis thus yields no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion can then improve the allocation of tra±c. The toll is equal to the congestion cost from an extra°ight times one minus a carrier's°ight share. At an airport like Chicago-O'Hare, this rule would imply that United and American would be charged for only about half of the congestion created by an additional°ight.
Introduction
Air tra±c delays in the U.S. have grown dramatically in the last few years, becoming a major public policy issue. In Europe, delays have plagued airline tra±c for an even longer period. A delay occurs when an airline°ight arrives more than 15 minutes late. Under this de¯nition, U.S.°ights experienced 374,116 delays in 1999, and delays grew to 450,289 in the year 2000, for a stunning 20.4 percent single-year increase. Table 1 shows delay data for the 15 U.S. airports with the most delays in 1999.
1 While the delay totals represent delays attributable to local operations at the given airport, the on-timē gures also capture the e®ect of delays elsewhere in the system (which a®ect arrivals, as well as subsequent departures, at the given airport). The poor on-time records of Newark and New York-La Guardia, which are widely recognized, are clear in the table, but the poor performance of other airports (Boston, Philadelphia, Washington-Dulles) is also evident. Table 1 shows that weather is the major reason for delays, accounting for well over half of the total in most cases. Typically, the second largest source of delays is \volume" (i.e.
tra±c exceeding airport capacity), whose share is also shown in the table. However, because weather-related delays often arise from restricted airport operations during bad weather, both sources actually re°ect the same problem: too many°ights attempting to take o® and land relative to airport capacity. 2
Solutions to the delay problem are now widely discussed in policy circles and in the press. Increasing the size of congested airports by investing in new runways is one remedy, although the long gestation period of such projects means that the bene¯ts lie far in the future. Improvement in air tra±c control technology, which can increase the capacity of the nation's airspace while also allowing busy airports to handle more°ights, is another remedy that is slowly being implemented. A third remedy for the delay problem is the imposition of conges-tion pricing at U.S. airports. With such a pricing mechanism, the landing fees paid by airlines would vary with the level of congestion at the airport. This approach stands in sharp contrast to current practice, where the landing fee incurred by a°ight depends only on the weight of the aircraft, being unrelated to time of day or airport conditions. Under congestion pricing, operating costs at peak hours would rise substantially relative to o®-peak costs, encouraging airlines to shift their°ights away from the peak. With a more-even distribution of tra±c across time, airport congestion would fall, reducing the number of delays. Although no U.S. airport has implemented congestion pricing, endorsements of such a system are now frequently heard.
For example, the in°uential 1999 monograph by the Transportation Research Board included a call for congestion pricing among its host of airline policy recommendations.
The theory of congestion pricing has been developed mainly through analysis of road pricing (see Small (1992) for a survey). The theory demonstrates that peak usage of a road or other congested facility is excessive because each user does not take the delays he imposes on fellow users into account. Peak usage can be appropriately restricted by imposing a congestion toll equal to the cost of the external delays that each user imposes.
Transportation researchers have long recognized that this principle applies to airports as well as urban highways. Levine (1969) and Carlin and Park (1970) o®er the earliest discussions of airport congestion pricing, with later treatments given by Morrison (1983) and Morrison and Winston (1989) . The most sophisticated analysis, however, is provided by Daniel (1995 Daniel ( , 2000 Daniel ( , 2001 , who develops a detailed simulation model that shows the e®ects of congestion pricing in a realistic setting.
Given the intense current focus on the airport congestion problem and possible remedies, it is important to ensure that our understanding of the congestion problem is sound on a theoretical level. However, most of the previous literature can be criticized for simply extrapolating the lessons of road-pricing models to the case of airports without recognizing a critical di®erence between these contexts. In particular, although road users are appropriately viewed as atomistic, with each user small relative to total tra±c, this view is incorrect in the case of airlines. As seen in The purpose of the present paper is to show that, when the atomistic model is abandoned, the verdict on congestion is softened. While atomistic users of a congested facility ignore their external e®ects, the analysis shows that a nonatomistic airline takes into account a portion of the congestion caused by each of its°ights. In particular, the airline internalizes the congestion each°ight imposes on the other°ights it operates. This internalization suggests that the overallocation of°ights to peak hours may not be as severe in practice as an atomistic model would predict. Indeed, in the case where an airport is served by a single monopolistic carrier, the analysis shows that the peak/o®-peak allocation of°ights may be e±cient. These¯ndings are important because they suggest a more-limited role for airport congestion pricing than that envisioned by many analysts.
Since Daniel (1995) recognizes the possible internalization of airport congestion, this basic insight has appeared before in the literature. However, an important contribution of the present paper is to develop the insight in the context of a transparent model (Daniel's simulation framework is highly complex). Moreover, the current model has an important feature that is missing from previous work. In particular, the internalization of congestion in the model occurs partly through congestion's e®ect on airfares.
To see this contribution more clearly, note that two types of costs from airport congestion are recognized in the model. These are additional passenger time costs, which capture the value of time lost to delays, and increased airline operating costs, re°ecting the greater crew expenses and reduced aircraft utilization resulting from congestion. In Daniel's model, the airline is assumed to allocate its°ights across peak and o®-peak periods so as to minimize the sum of these costs. While this is a convenient behavioral assumption, its drawback is that passenger time costs are not actually a direct cost to the airline. Carriers may end up taking such costs into account, but the proper avenue for such an e®ect must be through airfares. In other words, the need to o®er a fare discount for travel during a congested period forces the carrier to take passenger time costs into account. The present model follows this approach, portraying the airline as a pro¯t maximizer charging congestion-sensitive fares. When the carrier has market power, it takes this fare sensitivity into account in allocating°ights between the peak and o®-peak periods. Relative to a cost-minimizing model, the result is a more-realistic framework for analyzing internalization of airport congestion.
The model assumes that the day consists of two travel periods, a narrow, congestible peak period and an broader o®-peak period where congestion never arises. Passengers are represented by a continuum, with the bene¯ts of peak and o®-peak travel di®ering for each individual, but with both bene¯ts increasing across the continuum. When the two bene¯t functions satisfy a single-crossing condition, the continuum divides at a critical point between the peak and o®-peak periods. Fares are set taking travel bene¯ts and the time cost of peak travel into account, and the airline then maximizes pro¯t.
The analysis begins by characterizing the socially optimal tra±c allocation between the peak and o®-peak periods. To compare equilibrium outcomes to the social optimum, the discussion¯rst considers the benchmark competitive case, where carriers are atomistic. Then, the analysis turns to the case of a perfectly discriminating monopolist, who can charge a di®erent fare to each passenger. The more-realistic case where the monopolist cannot discriminate is then considered, with fares di®ering only between the peak and o®-peak periods. Using the same assumption on fares, the analysis concludes with a discussion of oligopoly models, considering both the Cournot and Stackelberg cases. In each of the nonatomistic cases, congestion is partially or fully internalized, suggesting a limited role for congestion pricing.
Basic Analysis

The model
The analysis is based on the simplest possible model capable of illustrating the relevant issues. As noted above, the model distinguishes between two travel periods at a given airport, denoted peak and o®-peak. 3 The peak period consists of a relatively short time window containing the day's most desirable travel times, such as early morning or late afternoon. To be realistic, the peak could consist of a collection of disjoint time intervals representing these desirable times. The o®-peak period represents travel times not included in the peak.
To avoid inessential complications, the o®-peak period is assumed to be uncongested over the range of passenger allocations examined in the model. In e®ect, the demand for o®-peak travel is assumed to be small enough relative to airport capacity that o®-peak congestion never occurs. By contrast, the peak period is always congested over the range of relevant allocations.
Peak congestion depends on the number of°ights operating during the peak period, denoted n p . Congestion raises an airline's operating costs, with cost per°ight given by c in the o®-peak period and by c + g(n p ) in the congested peak period, where g is nondecreasing and
convex. The function g(¢) must be zero for n p su±ciently small, but its positive range (where the function is increasing) is assumed to be relevant. All°ights are assumed to use identical aircraft with¯xed seat capacity s, and for simplicity, a 100 percent load factor is assumed, so that all seats are¯lled.
To characterize the e®ect of congestion on passenger time costs, the demand side of the model must be developed. First, it is assumed that passengers are represented by a continuum with index µ. For simplicity, µ is uniformly distributed between zero and one with unit density, so that the total mass of passengers is unity. Passenger utility is given by the sum of consumption x and travel bene¯ts B, with u = x + B. Since consumption is equal to income minus the airfare, it follows that travel decisions can be based on the di®erence between bene¯ts B and the fare.
Travel bene¯ts depend on µ, and they di®er for peak and o®-peak travel. The bene¯ts from o®-peak travel are given by the function b o (µ). The bene¯ts of peak travel, which are a®ected by congestion and thus by n p , are represented by B p (µ; n p ). For most of the analysis, an important restriction is placed on this function. In particular, the bene¯t function is assumed to be additively separable in its arguments, with B p (µ; n p )´b p (µ) ¡ t(n p ). The function b p thus represents the \gross" bene¯t of peak travel, which would apply in the absence of congestion. The function t represents the additional passenger time costs resulting from travel during the congested peak period. The key implication of separability is that these time costs do not depend on µ. Like g, t(¢) is assumed to be nondecreasing and convex, and its positive range (where the function is increasing) is assumed to be relevant.
As the analysis will demonstrate, the additive separability of B p yields clearcut conclusions regarding internalization of congestion. Once these conclusions are derived, the discussion considers the nonseparable case, showing how the results become less clearcut. It is shown, however, that the overall lesson of the analysis (substantial internalization of congestion) continues to apply in this more general case.
In order to make the analysis tractable, the properties of the bene¯t functions b p and b o are also restricted by imposing a number of simplifying assumptions. The¯rst assumption is that no two passengers have the same o®-peak bene¯ts, with the same statement applying to peak bene¯ts. Exploiting the¯rst of these properties, let consumers be sorted in increasing order
The second assumption is that peak bene¯ts are also increasing in µ, with b 0 p (µ) > 0 also holding over the unit interval. This assumption is natural because it says that peak and o®-peak travel bene¯ts increase in step with one another across the passenger continuum. Thus, a high value for peak travel is associated with a high value for o®-peak travel, indicating a natural linkage in a passenger's valuation of the two travel periods.
A third assumption is imposed in order to easily characterize the allocation of passengers between the peak and o®-peak periods. This assumption says that the bene¯t functions b p (µ) and b o (µ) exhibit a single-crossing property. In particular, one of the following relationships
. Thus, the peak bene¯t function is either steeper everywhere than the o®-peak function, has the same slope, or is°a tter everywhere.
It should be noted that, in other continuum-based models of consumer sorting, a singlecrossing property can be generated from primitive assumptions on preferences rather than being imposed arbitrarily, as is necessary here. Epple and Romer (1991) , for example, rely on a normality assumption to generate single crossing in their local public¯nance model, which guarantees a simple pattern of consumer sorting by income across communities.
To make the above single-crossing assumptions more concrete, µ could be viewed as an index of the passenger's tendency to travel on business. Since business travel, associated with a high µ, is a crucial job requirement, both peak and o®-peak travel bene¯ts should be high relative to bene¯ts for a low-µ leisure traveler. As a result, b 0 p ; b 0 o > 0 should hold. Moreover, since business travel must occur during the early and late peak hours to avoid disruption of the work day, peak travel bene¯ts should increase relative to o®-peak bene¯ts as µ increases,
Note that this single-crossing inequality actually says nothing about the levels of the bene¯t functions. However, to avoid a degenerate equilibrium, it is shown below that the levels of the functions must be such that they intersect at an intermediate value of µ. Thus, b p (µ) > (<) b o (µ) must hold for high (low) µ, indicating that peak bene¯ts are higher (lower) than o®-peak bene¯ts for business (leisure) passengers.
The other two single-crossing cases are less easily rationalized in the business-leisure con-
o , then the di®erential between peak and o®-peak bene¯ts is constant across passenger types, which would be true if the leisure passenger shared the business passenger's preference for peak hours. If b 0 p < b 0 o holds, on the other hand, then peak bene¯ts decline relative to o®-peak bene¯ts as the tendency for business travel rises, a counterintuitive pattern. Because of the lower plausibility of these latter cases, the bulk of the analysis is carried out under the assumption that the¯rst single-crossing case, where b 0 p > b 0 o holds, is relevant. However, recognizing that the alternate cases may be appropriate under some other scenario, the discussion shows how they e®ect the results of the analysis.
It should be noted that, under the business-leisure interpretation of the passenger continuum, the separability assumption for peak bene¯ts may be unrealistic. In particular, the higher time valuation of business passengers would suggest that, rather than depending on n p alone, time cost t should be an increasing function of µ. In this case, the bene¯t function B p (µ; n p ) cannot be expressed in a separable fashion, an outcome whose consequences are explored below.
The social optimum
The social optimum consists of an allocation of passengers to the peak and o®-peak periods that maximizes welfare, measured as the di®erence between travel bene¯ts for passengers and airline costs. Given the single-crossing assumption, the optimal allocation will have the property that high-µ passengers use the peak period, with low-µ passengers traveling o®-peak.
The problem then involves choosing the critical point µ ¤ that separates the two groups of passengers. In addition, a lower bound µ is chosen, below which consumers do not travel.
To show that passengers are allocated as claimed between the peak and o®-peak, suppose to the contrary that a high-µ passenger with µ = µ h were allocated to the o®-peak period, while a low-µ passenger with µ = µ l < µ h were allocated to the peak. Combined travel bene¯ts for the two passengers is then b o (µ h ) + b p (µ l ) ¡ t(n p ). Now consider switching the assignments of the two passengers, which would yield the new bene¯t expression
that since the number of peak and o®-peak passengers is una®ected, t(n p ) as well as airline costs are unchanged. Subtracting the¯rst expression above from the second, the change in With high-µ passengers assigned to the peak, the welfare measure (travel bene¯ts minus airline costs) can be written
where n o is the number of o®-peak°ights (recall that the density of µ is unitary). The discreteness of peak and o®-peak°ights is ignored, with both n p and n o chosen in a continuous fashion to satisfy the relations sn p = 1 ¡ µ ¤ and sn o = µ ¤ ¡ µ (recall that s gives seats per°i ght). Substituting in (1), W can then be rewritten as
Di®erentiating (2), the¯rst-order condition for choice of µ is
with equality holding if µ > 0. This condition says that, for the lowest-µ consumer who travels, bene¯ts are at least as large as the cost an airline seat (cost per°ight divided by seats per °ight). If b o (0) > c=s, so that bene¯ts for the consumer at the bottom of the continuum exceed the seat cost, then (3) is satis¯ed as an inequality, and all consumers travel. If the reverse inequality holds, then (3) is satis¯ed as an equality at some positive µ, and consumers at the bottom of the continuum do not travel.
Assuming an interior solution, the¯rst-order condition for choice of µ ¤ is given by
where n p = (1 ¡ µ ¤ )=s. It can be shown that, for an interior µ ¤ to emerge, the bene¯t functions b p and b o must intersect between µ and µ = 1, as noted above. 4 To interpret (4), note that the¯rst expression gives the change in travel bene¯ts for a passenger who is switched from the o®-peak to the peak period. As a result of this switch, which corresponds to a reduction in µ ¤ , the passenger gains b p (µ ¤ )¡ t(n p ) in peak bene¯ts while losing b o (µ ¤ ) in o®-peak bene¯ts. The extra peak passenger also generates a congestion e®ect. His presence requires a 1=s increase in peak°ights, yielding (1=s)t 0 (n p ) in additional time cost for each peak passenger. Since there are 1 ¡ µ ¤ such passengers, the total e®ect is given by the product of the last two expressions, or n p t 0 (n p ) (the second term in (4)). The congestion caused by higher peak tra±c also raises operating costs for existing°ights. This e®ect is captured by (1=s)n p g 0 (n p ) in (4), which equals the increase in cost per°ight ((1=s)g 0 ) times the number of°ights a®ected. Finally, the need to o®er more peak°ights also raises airline costs. While the o®setting reduction in o®-peak°ights means that the part of the cost expression involving c is unchanged, the extra peak-period°ights generate additional costs of (1=s)g(n p ). Note that this term is not part of the congestion e®ect, which equals n p t 0 (n p ) + (1=s)n p g 0 (n p ). With all these e®ects taken into account, the optimal µ ¤ thus balances the individual gain in travel bene¯ts against incremental congestion and operating costs as passengers switch to the peak period. 5 This rule is similar to those emerging from the road-pricing literature.
Under the maintained assumptions on the functions b p , b o , t and g, the second partial derivatives W µ ¤ µ ¤ and W µµ from (3) are both negative, and the cross partial is zero. As a result, the second-order condition for the optimization problem is satis¯ed. For future reference, note that since the LHS of (4) equals ¡W µ ¤, this expression is increasing rather than decreasing in µ ¤ .
Analysis of Equilibria
The competitive case
To analyze equilibria under di®erent market structures, it is useful to begin by considering the competitive case, where carriers are atomistic. In this case, each carrier operates a single°i ght, and fares just cover operating costs. Thus, peak and o®-peak fares are given by
To determine the allocation of passengers in the competitive case, the¯rst step is to note that, at the point where the continuum divides between the peak and o®-peak, the relevant passenger (whose type is again denoted µ ¤ ) is indi®erent between travel in the two periods. In
indicating that travel bene¯ts net of the fare are equal across periods. Then, note that since b 0 p > b 0 o holds, all passengers with µ > µ ¤ strictly prefer the peak while all passengers with µ < µ ¤ strictly prefer the o®-peak.
The minimum µ value among o®-peak passengers satis¯es b o (µ) ¡ f o¸0 , indicating that the gain from travel is nonnegative.
Rearranging the last condition and substituting f o from (6), the resulting condition is the same as (3). Therefore, the margin separating travelers from non-travelers is determined e±ciently in the competitive case. However, the former group is divided ine±ciently between the peak and o®-peak periods. To see this, the above indi®erence condition can be rewritten
After substituting the fare expressions from (5) and (6), the condition determining µ ¤ then reduces to
where n p again equals (1 ¡ µ ¤ )=s.
A comparison of (7) and (4) shows that the terms n p t 0 (n p ) + (1=s)n p g 0 (n p ), which capture the congestion e®ect, are absent from the equilibrium condition. As a result, in determining µ ¤ , competitive carriers do not take into account the congestion caused by adding an extra passenger to the peak period. Since the congestion terms are subtracted in (4), it follows that the LHS is negative at the equilibrium µ ¤ value, where (7) equals zero. This fact implies that µ ¤ must be raised from the equilibrium to reach the optimum (recall that the LHS of (4) is increasing in µ ¤ ). Thus, moving from the competitive equilibrium to the optimum means reallocating passengers from the peak to the o®-peak period, indicating that the peak period is over-used in equilibrium.
To limit this over-use, the solution is to impose congestion pricing. The peak-period congestion toll, which depends on n p , equals the congestion cost imposed by an additional°i ght, and it is given by
When the carriers are charged R(n p ) per°ight, f p in (5) is augmented to include the additional expression R(n p )=s. Eq. (7) is then modi¯ed to include the missing congestion terms n p t 0 (n p )+ (1=s)n p g 0 (n p ), and the new equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. 6 The congestion toll achieves this outcome by putting upward pressure on the peak fare, which diverts passengers to the o®-peak period. It can be shown that, once µ ¤ has adjusted to the new equilibrium, the peak fare remains higher than prior to imposition of the toll.
The case of a perfectly discriminating monopolist
Having developed the competitive benchmark, the discussion now turns to alternate cases where carriers have market power. The natural starting point is the case of a perfectly discriminating monopolist, who can charge a di®erent fare to each passenger. Although such behavior on the part of¯rms is usually thought to be implausible, the extensive price discrimination practiced by the airline industry suggests that a perfectly discriminating model is far from outlandish (see, for example, Borenstein and Rose (1994) ).
Letting f p (µ) and f o (µ) denote the peak and o®-peak fares charged to a type-µ passenger, the monopolist sets these fares so as to make the passenger indi®erent between traveling and not traveling. Thus, the fares are set so as to exhaust travel bene¯ts, satisfying
Using the previous argument along with (9) and (10), it is easily seen that the monopolist maximizes revenue by allocating high-µ passengers to the peak and low-µ passengers to the o®-peak. 7 Pro¯t is then given by
dµ minus airline costs. However, after substituting for the fares using (9) and (10), the resulting objective function is identical to the social welfare measure W in (1). Thus, in maximizing pro¯t, the perfectly discriminating monopolist replicates the social optimum, generating optimal values of µ and µ ¤ . While this conclusion is not especially surprising, it is important from a policy perspective.
In particular, the conclusion suggests that airport congestion is fully internalized under conditions that are not particularly unrealistic. This outcome occurs when a carrier has substantial ability to price discriminate, and when it controls virtually all of an airport's tra±c, as is the case at a number of dominated hubs (see Table 1 ). The analysis suggests that congestion levels at such airports may not be far from optimal, conditional on airport capacity. While capacity growth itself may be desirable, the analysis implies that there may be little or no role for government intervention in reallocating tra±c away from peak periods. Indeed, imposition of a congestion toll under these conditions would lead to a suboptimal level of peak congestion, with ine±cient under-use of the peak period.
Interestingly, Daniel's (1995) ¯ndings undermine this conclusion. Daniel found that his simulation results replicated existing Minneapolis tra±c patterns better when the dominant hub carrier (Northwest) was assumed to behave atomistically, ignoring the congestion it imposed on itself, than when it took such congestion into account. While this¯nding sounds a note of caution in using the present model to draw policy conclusions, the¯nding is troublesome in that it seems inconsistent with optimizing behavior on the part of the airlines.
The case of a nondiscriminating monopolist
Recognizing that perfect price discrimination may not occur, it is useful to analyze the monopoly equilibrium when the¯rm cannot discriminate, charging uniform peak and o®-peak fares (again denoted f p and f o ). In this case, the distribution of passengers is governed by conditions analogous to those in the competitive case. The previous indi®erence condition for the type-µ ¤ passenger again applies, and this condition can be rearranged to read
In contrast to (6), the monopolist raises f o to exhaust travel bene¯ts for the lowest-µ passenger, so that µ satis¯es
The monopolist's revenue is given by
. Substituting for the fares using the above relationships, and subtracting costs, pro¯t equals
Di®erentiating (11), the¯rst-order condition for choice of µ is
with equality holding if µ > 0. Since b o (µ) > c=s holds at an interior monopoly equilibrium, it follows that µ exceeds the optimal value, which either satis¯es b o (µ) = c=s or is zero (recall that b 0 o > 0). The higher µ means the monopolist sets f o high enough so that some consumers who would have traveled under the social optimum choose not to do so. The monopolist is exploiting market power, recognizing that a higher fare excludes some consumers while generating more revenue from inframarginal passengers.
Di®erentiating (11), the¯rst-order condition for µ ¤ is given by
where n p again equals (1 ¡ µ ¤ )=s. This condition di®ers from the optimality condition (4) only in the appearance of the last term involving the bene¯t derivatives. Because the congestion terms continue to appear in (13), it follows that the nondiscriminating monopolist, like his discriminating counterpart, fully internalizes the congestion e®ect. 8
Even though congestion is again internalized, the extra term in (13) means that the allocation of passengers between the peak and o®-peak periods is not optimal. Because the single-crossing assumption implies b
o > 0, the extra term is negative, so that the LHS of (4) is positive at the equilibrium. It follows that µ ¤ must be decreased from the equilibrium to reach the optimum, implying that the monopolist allocates too few passengers to the peak period, relative to the social optimum.
Exploitation of market power accounts for the monopolist's internalization of congestion, while also explaining the appearance of the last term in (13). To see this, note that in adjusting µ ¤ , the monopolist must alter the peak fare to maintain the indi®erence condition, ensuring that passengers divide between the periods as intended. Because higher congestion reduces peak bene¯ts, the monopolist must cut f p as additional passengers are allocated to the peak period, an adjustment that maintains the indi®erence condition. This market-power e®ect is bene¯cial, causing the monopolist to restrict peak tra±c.
A \residual" market-power e®ect, which is not bene¯cial, is captured by the last term in (13). This residual e®ect arises because lower-bene¯t passengers are added as peak tra±c is raised, altering the di®erence between b p and b o for the type-µ ¤ passenger. Since b 0 p > b 0 o holds, peak bene¯ts fall by more than o®-peak bene¯ts as µ ¤ declines, which requires a further reduction in f p to maintain the indi®erence condition. This fare reduction leads to a further restriction of peak tra±c, generating under-use of the peak period.
The sign of the residual market-power e®ect, which underlies this result, obviously depends on the relationship between the bene¯t derivatives, a relationship that would be altered under a di®erent single-crossing assumption. To see the e®ect of changing this assumption, suppose that the bene¯t slopes were identically equal, with b 0 p´b 0 o . Then, the pattern of passenger assignments to the peak and o®-peak periods would be a matter of indi®erence to both the social planner and the monopolist, so that the current assignment (high-µ passengers in the peak) could be retained. All the previous analysis is then una®ected, but the extra term in (13) is now identically zero. As a result, the nondiscriminating monopoly equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. In this case, residual market-power e®ect does not distort the allocation of passengers between the two periods.
The remaining single-crossing case, where b 0 p < b 0 o holds, is considered in the appendix. In this case, passenger assignments are reversed, with the peak period used by low-µ, rather than high-µ, passengers. The analysis shows that, for the competitive case and the perfectly discriminating monopolist, the previous e±ciency verdicts are una®ected. While the nondiscriminating monopolist continues to internalize congestion, the residual market-power e®ect may now lead to the assignment of too many, rather than too few, passengers to the peak period. Thus, the direction of the distortion in the nondiscriminating case depends on the form of the single-crossing condition.
Summarizing the analysis up to this point yields Proposition 1. While competitive carriers fail to internalize the congestion e®ect, leading to over-use of the peak period, congestion is fully internalized by a perfectly discriminating monopolist, who replicates the social optimum. A nondiscriminating monopolist again internalizes the congestion e®ect, but a residual market-power e®ect may distort the allocation of passengers, yielding over-or under-use of the peak period.
The important implication of this result is that, even in the more-realistic nondiscriminating case, there appears to be no role for congestion pricing at an airport dominated by a monopolistic carrier. The airport's tra±c allocation may not be optimal, but the culprit is not a failure to internalize the e®ects of congestion.
The case of Cournot oligopoly
Consider now the oligopoly case, where each of k identical¯rms behaves in Cournot fashion.
While a monopolist can be portrayed as choosing µ ¤ and µ, each oligopoly¯rm can only choose the number of its own°ights, with the aggregation of all°ights determining µ ¤ and µ. Letting n i p and n i o give peak and o®-peak°ights for carrier i, µ ¤ and µ satisfy 1 ¡ µ ¤ = s
can then be written as
Carrier j's pro¯t is then written
Carrier j chooses n j o and n j p to maximize (16) subject to (14) and (15), viewing other carriers'°i ght choices as parametric. Letting n p denote P k i=1 n i p , total peak°ights, the resulting¯rst-order condition for n j p reduces to
This condition di®ers from monopoly condition (13) in two ways. First, the congestion e®ect is only partly internalized. Rather than being multiplied by total°ights n p , t 0 and (1=s)g 0 are multiplied by n j p , carrier j's°ights. Thus in choosing the number of°ights, carrier j considers only the congestion it imposes on itself, which consists of additional time costs for its own passengers and extra own-operating costs. The second di®erence relative to (13) is that the residual market-power e®ect represented by the last term applies only to a subset of passengers, those using carrier j.
Symmetry of the equilibrium can be used to rewrite (17) as
Written in this way, the¯rst-order condition shows that each carrier internalizes a fraction 1=k of the congestion e®ect, accounting only for the congestion it imposes on itself. Note that as k becomes large, (17) converges to the competitive condition (7), verifying for the present model the usual conclusion that perfect competition is the limiting case of oligopoly. 9
Although the residual market-power e®ect continues to distort the allocation of tra±c, the distortion due to uninternalized congestion, which creates a tendency for over-use of the peak period, can be remedied by a congestion toll. To eliminate this distortion, the toll per°ight should be set at
As in the competitive case, imposition of the toll moves µ ¤ and n p toward the social optimum, while raising the peak-period fare. Note that, because of the residual market-power e®ect, the equilibrium generated by the toll in (19) will not be exactly optimal unless b 0 p´b 0 o . 10 The analysis thus demonstrates that each airline is charged for congestion that it fails to internalize, with the toll equal to the congestion cost from an extra°ight times one minus the carrier's°ight share. In the case of a duopoly airport, roughly approximated by Chicago-O'Hare, each of the duopolists would be charged for half of the congestion associated with an additional°ight. 11
If this principle were extrapolated to an asymmetric model, it would imply that small airlines should be charged a larger toll per°ight than large airlines, re°ecting their limited internalization of congestion. Unfortunately, such a rule might have undesirable competitive e®ects, given that ability-to-pay may be lower for small than for large carriers. However, since e±ciency analysis is problematic in an asymmetric setting, the basis for this rule may be questionable. To see this, note that one way of generating an asymmetric equilibrium is to assume cost di®erences across¯rms. But in such a setting, a planner would allocate all passengers to the e±cient (large)¯rms, so that small, ine±cient¯rms would disappear in the social optimum. Evidently, to generate a social optimum that resembles observed asymmetric equilibria, a richer model is needed. Only in the context of such a model would statements about asymmetric congestion tolls be reliable.
Summarizing the preceding analysis yields
Proposition 2. In a Cournot oligopoly, each carrier internalizes only the congestion it imposes on itself, allowing a role for congestion pricing. In the symmetric model, the toll per°ight equals the congestion cost from an extra°ight times one minus a carrier's airport°ight share. Imposition of such a toll, however, cannot eliminate any remaining tra±c misallocation due to the residual market-power e®ect.
The case of a Stackelberg oligopoly
It is interesting to explore how the oligopoly results change if Cournot behavior is replaced by the assumption that one carrier is a Stackelberg leader. Because a general analysis of this case is infeasible, additional simplifying assumptions are imposed. First, attention is restricted to a model with just two carriers, with carrier 1 being the leader and 2 the follower. Because of the problematic nature of models with asymmetric costs (see above), the two carriers are assumed to have identical costs. As a result, the realistic case where a large leader interacts with a group of small, fringe followers is not considered. In addition, all the functions in the model are assumed to be linear, with t 0´¿ , g 0´°, and b 0 p = b 0 o´¯( the bene¯t functions thus have a common slope).
Under these assumptions, the¯rst-order conditions for carrier 2 are derived, using (14)-(16), and these conditions are di®erentiated to yield reaction functions, which show how the follower's decision variables, n 2 o and n 2 p , change in response to the leader's variables, n 1 o and n 1 p . Taking the follower's reactions into account, the equations (14)- (16) are again used to derive the¯rst-order conditions for the leader. Then, combining the follower's and the leader's conditions, which constitute a linear equation system, the Stackelberg equilibrium is computed algebraically. The Cournot equilibrium is also computed, and the results are compared.
Before discussing the solutions, it is important to note how the leader's¯rst-order conditions change relative to the Cournot case. Because @n 2 p =@n 1 p = ¡1=2, the follower reduces his peak°ights by half in response to a unit increase in the leader's°ights. As a result, the additional congestion generated by an increase in the leader's°ights is partly mitigated.
This e®ect is manifested in the leader's¯rst-order condition by a 50 percent reduction in the amount of his own congestion that is internalized. In other words, the congestion terms n 1 p t 0 (n p )+(1=s)n 1 p g 0 (n p ) from (17), which reduce to n 1 p ¿ +(1=s)n 1 p°u nder linearity, are replaced by [n 1 p ¿ + (1=s)n 1 p°] =2.
Although the residual market-power term in (17) is zero given equal bene¯t slopes, new market-power e®ects emerge in both of the leader's¯rst-order conditions. As a result, it is di±cult to predict the net e®ect of the reduced internalization of congestion. However, the solutions show that n 1 p is larger in the Stackelberg than in the Cournot equilibrium, indicating that carrier 1's peak°ights increase when it becomes a leader. Conversely, n 2 p is smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium, so that carrier 2's peak°ights fall when it becomes a follower.
Moreover, the increase in n 1 p dominates the decline in n 2 p , so that the total number of peak°i ghts, n p = n 1 p + n 2 p , is larger in the Stackelberg equilibrium. By contrast, the change in total o®-peak°ights is ambiguous. Because the details of this analysis are tedious and complex, they are not presented. Summarizing yields Proposition 3. In a linear duopoly model with symmetric¯rm costs, the tendency toward over-use of the peak period due to uninternalized congestion is exacerbated under Stackelberg behavior (relative to the Cournot case).
The e®ects of nonseparability
The previous results have been derived under separability of the peak travel bene¯t function, and it is important to appraise the e®ects of eliminating this restriction. With nonseparability of B p (µ; n p ), the second integral in the welfare function (2) becomes
while the ¡n p t 0 term is replaced by n p R 1 µ ¤ B n p (µ; n p )dµ=(1 ¡ µ ¤ ) < 0, where the n superscript denotes B p 's negative partial derivative with respect to n p . 12
Although nonseparability has no e®ect on the conclusions of the competitive and discriminating-monopoly analysis, the results on internalization of congestion for the other market structures are altered. To see this, observe that the form of the equilibrium condition (13) for the nondiscriminating monopolist is unchanged aside from notation. The bene¯t-di®erential term is modi¯ed as above, the residual market-power e®ect involves B µ p instead of b 0 p , and ¡n p t 0 is replaced by n p B n p (µ ¤ ; n p ). Because this latter term di®ers from the expression replacing ¡n p t 0 in (4) (the above integral), congestion may not be exactly internalized by the nondiscriminating monopolist. The outcome depends on the direction of the following inequality:
To evaluate (20) under the business-leisure interpretation of the passenger continuum, note that B n p in this case should become more negative as µ increases, re°ecting the greater value of the time lost to congestion for high-µ passengers. The integral in (20), which represents the average value of B n p between µ ¤ and 1, is then more negative than B n p (µ ¤ ; n p ) (for a given n p ). Because the integral appears in the social optimality condition while the latter expression appears in the equilibrium condition, it follows that the monopolist does not fully internalize congestion. Under other scenarios, of course, the inequality in (20) could be reversed, implying over-internalization of congestion.
These discrepancies arise because, in focusing on the type-µ ¤ passenger via the indi®erence condition, the monopolist does not consider congestion e®ects felt by inframarginal passengers.
In the case where B p is separable, the marginal, type-µ ¤ individual turns out to be a perfect representative for inframarginal passengers, and congestion is properly internalized. Otherwise, internalization is not exact. Similar conclusions apply in the oligopoly case. Rather than exactly internalizing the congestion it imposes on itself, an oligopoly carrier may internalize a smaller or larger share when bene¯ts are nonseparable. It is important to recognize that, as in the monopoly case, this conclusion tempers the results of the analysis without overturning its main lesson. This lesson is that the exercise of market power leads carriers to internalize a portion of the congestion they generate, with this portion rising as market power grows.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modi¯ed when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, either discriminating or nondiscriminating, congestion is fully internalized, provided that a separability assumption on travel bene¯ts is satis¯ed. In allocating tra±c between the peak and o®-peak periods, the monopolist fully accounts for the passenger time cost associated with peak congestion (which alters fares), while also taking account of its impact on his own operating costs. The analysis thus suggests no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. This conclusion is quali¯ed in the absence of separability. Although the nondiscriminating monopolist may not exactly internalize congestion in this case, substantial internalization still occurs.
Under a Cournot oligopoly, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves (assuming separability). A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion can then improve the allocation of tra±c. The toll is equal to the congestion cost from an extra°ight times one minus a carrier's°ight share.
This result shows the°aw in a simple extrapolation of results from the road-pricing literature to the airport setting. Instead of being charged for all the congestion an added°ight causes, as would occur if airlines were treated like road users, the toll should re°ect only the costs imposed on other carriers. At an airport like Chicago-O'Hare, this rule would imply that United and American would be charged for only about half of the congestion created by an additional°ight. At a monopoly airport, the rule implies a zero toll since all congestion is internalized. Given the likelihood that some form of congestion pricing will be implemented at U.S. airports, awareness of such results may be valuable. Baker (2000) .
7 Passengers can be directed to such an allocation if they are charged more than the amount in (9) or (10) in the period where the monopolist does not want them to travel.
8 It is assumed that the second-order conditions for the monopolist's optimization problem are satis¯ed. These conditions involve b 00 p and b 00 o , which have no natural sign.
9 Once symmetry is imposed, the¯rst-order condition for choice of n o (µ)¸c=s, indicating that the market-power e®ect in the choice of µ applies only to a carrier's own passengers.
10 With the maintained single-crossing assumption, the peak-period will be under-used, as in the nondiscriminating monopoly case. As before, this conclusion could be reversed under an alternate assumption.
11 It is interesting to note that this conclusion overturns the well-known self-¯nancing rule for congested facilities, which says that toll revenue exactly covers the construction cost of a congested facility built with constant returns to scale (see Small (1992) ). To see this, let the t and g functions depend on airport capacity H, and assume that the congestion-cost expression is appropriately homogeneous of degree zero in H and n p . Then, the optimality condition for H can be written n p [sn p t n (n p ; H) + n p g n (n p ; H)] = HF 0 (H), where F is the cost function for capacity and the n superscripts denote derivatives with respect to n p . Using (19), congestion-toll revenue is equal to the LHS of the previous expression times (1 ¡ 1=k), while the RHS equals F(H) under constant returns. Thus, toll revenue fails to cover the cost of the optimal-size airport.
12 To avoid complications, the modi¯ed single-crossing inequalty B µ p (µ; n p ) > b 0 o (µ) must hold for all values of n p as well as for all µ (the µ superscript denotes partial derivative).
13 The optimality condition is [b p (µ) ¡ t(n p )] ¡ c=s ¡ n p t 0 (n p ) ¡ (1=s)[g(n p ) + n p g 0 (n p )]¸0, with equality holding if n p > 0.
14 Since µ now satis¯es b p (µ)¡t(n p )¸c=s in the competitive case, it follows that the expression in footnote 13 is negative at the competitive equilibrium. Since that expression is increasing in µ, it follows that µ must be raised above the equilibrium value to reach the optimum. Similarly, since (7) again holds at the competitive equilibrium, the LHS of the optimality condition (4) is negative at the equilibrium. Because that expression is now decreasing in µ ¤ , it follows that µ ¤ must be reduced from the equilibrium to reach the optimum. With the optimum having a higher µ and lower µ ¤ than the equilibrium, it follows that equilibrium involves over-use of the peak period. 15 The equilibrium condition consists of the optimality condition from footnote 13 with the term ¡(1 ¡ µ)b 0 p (µ) added. At an interior equilibrium, where the modi¯ed expression equals zero, the expression in footnote 13 is positive. Since that expression is increasing in µ, it follows that the optimal value (which makes the expression zero or is itself zero) is less than the equilibrium value.
